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Abstract. We present a novel and generalised notion of doping clean-
ness for cyber-physical systems that allows for perturbing the inputs and
observing the perturbed outputs both in the time– and value–domains.
We instantiate our definition using existing notions of conformance for
cyber-physical systems. We show that our generalised definitions are
essential in a data-driven method for doping detection and apply our
definitions to a case study concerning diesel emission tests.
1 Introduction
System doping, in our terminology, is an intentional intervention causing a
change in the system’s normal behaviour against the interests of the user or
other stakeholders (such as the society at large). Examples of system doping are
widespread and range from vendors’ enforcing a monopoly on chargers and spare
parts (by checking for and refusing third-party chargers and spare parts, respec-
tively) to tampering with exhaust emission in order to detect and pass emission
tests. Doping can be the result of embedding a piece of code or smuggling a
piece of electronic circuit into the system and it can be caused by the original
developers or by hackers. Software and system doping has been studied in the
past couple of years and rigorous theories for it have been developed [8,9,15].
These theories were subsequently adopted in order to detect doping, or formally,
to check system cleanness [10,32] (corresponding to the absence of doping).
In the present paper, we extend the theory of doping to the setting of cyber-
physical systems (CPS) by exploiting the notions of conformance testing for
CPS [1,17,33]. The existing theories of software doping define doping in terms
of drastic deviations in output as a result of minor deviations in input, where
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Fig. 1. Running example: specified (a) and actual (b) test cycles and emission foot-
prints obtained from different (fictitious) vehicles (c) and (d).
the term “deviation” refers to differences in validity of propositions or values of
variables. However, the current notions come short of properly dealing with the
issues of retiming and delays, which are commonly present in the signals of CPS.
We observe that this is an essential aspect of detecting doping for cyber-physical
systems: often the traces to be tested for doping have subtly different timing
behaviour, e.g., due to measurement and calibration errors or due to the slight
deviations of human actors in acting upon the planned scenarios. The insufficient
treatment of retiming and delays can both lead to false negatives, i.e., missing
cases of doping, as well as false positives, i.e., reporting spurious doping cases.
To address these issues, we exploit the notion of conformance to devise a
general theory of being clean from doping and instantiate that theory with some
existing notions of conformance for hybrid systems. We show how these notions
can account for retiming and lead to more precise notions of cleanness.
We illustrate the usefulness of our theory by empirical analysis of diesel
engine exhaust emissions in the context of one of the official test cycles, the
New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) [42]. In particular, we show that catering
for retiming is essential in effectively exploiting the actual driving cycles for
performing doping analysis. We thus demonstrate that our new theory remedies
a major shortcoming in the existing notions from the literature. To facilitate
the presentation, we use throughout the remainder of this paper the following
simple running example, which is inspired by our case study.
Example 1. Figure 1.(a) shows two test cycles (evolution of speed over time),
designed to detect whether the exhaust emission control of a particular vehicle
is doped. The test cycle ist , depicted with a black solid line, is the standard one
prescribed by the (fictitious) official regulation, while test cycle idev , depicted by
a red dotted line, is a slight deviation thereof. If the exhaust emissions measured
during the test cycle idev turn out to be significantly higher than the ones mea-
sured in test cycle ist , then we can conclude that the exhaust emission system
is potentially doped, since it appears tailored to the standard test cycle.
Figure 1.(b) addresses a notorious problem of testing cars: a human tester is
supposed to drive the car as just described, however, she can do this only up to
a certain imprecision. Assume her driving of idev exhibits a slight time shift τ
relative to the test cycle, as in iddev , while ist is being driven as intended.
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The result of a test is the emission footprint measured at the exhaust pipe
of the car. Figure 1.(c) and Fig. 1.(d) show two different possible test results
(obtained from different cars) for the scenario in Fig. 1.(b). Intuitively, the foot-
prints in Fig. 1.(c) provide significant evidence for doping – a slightly different
test cycle has resulted in significantly larger footprint. However, due to the time
shift on the input side Fig. 1.(b) the point-wise difference of the two driven
test-cycles has grown very large. As we show in the remainder of this paper,
the existing theory of doping fails to detect such a clear evidence, due to the
minor delay during the execution of the driving cycle. The emission footprint in
Fig. 1.(d) is another (synthetic) example of a significant deviation which cannot
be detected for the input in Fig. 1.(b) using existing theories; this latter footprint
sheds some light on the intricate design decisions in the theory we develop in
this paper.
The contributions for this paper can be summarized as follows:
– We define a general notion of conformance that can express different ways of
comparing execution traces by allowing deviations both in value and in time.
– We define a general notion of cleanness for hybrid systems, and show that it
subsumes the existing notion of robust cleanness [15].
– We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed generic framework by apply-
ing it to software doping tests in the automotive domain, where we show that
the new cleanness definition is able to flag a case of software doping that goes
unnoticed when robust cleanness is used.
2 Related Work
The term “software doping” was coined around 2015 [30] in media uncovering the
diesel exhaust emissions scandal. An informal problem formulation [8] pointed
out the general phenomenon of intentionally added hidden software behaviour,
which is not in the interest of the consumer. Shortly after, this observation has
been complemented by a set of formal cleanness definitions [15] laying the theo-
retical foundations upon which formal methods to detect such software behaviour
can be used. It is possible to detect missing functionality and undesired exist-
ing functionality. The definitions support both sequential programs and non-
deterministic reactive programs. To check satisfaction of the definitions, it is
necessary to compare two (or more) execution traces of the same system. Such
properties are called hyperproperties [13] (whereas classical properties are trace
properties). Tool support for analysing hyperproperties typically requires high
computational effort [12,25]. There exist several temporal logics for analysing
satisfaction of trace properties of various kinds of systems, one of them being
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [39] for systems producing outputs in discrete
time steps and properties that do not consider the time passing between out-
puts. LTL has been extended to the logic HyperLTL, which can express hyper-
properties by allowing explicit quantification of execution traces in front of an
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LTL formula [12]. Tools for model-checking boolean circuits, satisfiability and
monitoring of HyperLTL specifications have been developed [6,11,21–25,29].
Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [36] is an extension of LTL that adds support
for time constraints and real-valued signals. Tools exist that automatically try
to falsify STL formulas [7,18]. There has been an extension of STL to HyperSTL
in a similar fashion as it was done for HyperLTL [37]. The syntax of HyperSTL,
however, is not able to express the cleanness definitions (for deterministic sys-
tems) in a way that allows (efficient) falsification. Robust cleanness is defined for
distance functions on inputs and outputs [15]. When used with temporal logics
the distance functions are restricted to those compatible with the logics. To be
fully independent, robust cleanness analysis has been embedded into the theory
of model-based testing [10] with input-output conformance [40,41].
Notions of conformance for discrete event systems have been discussed for
almost a century. The earliest work on this topic dates back to 1960’s when
researchers studied model-based testing of digital circuits using Finite State
Machine models [31,35]. Concurrency theory contributed ideas to this field, such
as decoupling (i.e., removing the synchronised assumption between) inputs and
outputs and observing failures to engage in a communication (and more specif-
ically quiescence) [16,40]. A theory of conformance testing for systems with
continuous dynamics was developed by Michiel van Osch [38]; this theory did
not gain much popularity in practice, partly because of its insufficient treat-
ment of approximation (e.g., differences in values and retiming). Pappas and
Girard [27,28] proposed the use of Metric Bisimulation for conformance check-
ing in dynamical systems and Pappas and Fainekos [20] developed a falsification
framework for the same purpose. This research led to two notions of conformance
used in the present paper, namely hybrid conformance by Abbas and Fainekos
[1] and Skorokhod conformance by Deshmukh, Majumdar, and Prabhu [17].
3 Preliminaries
Semantic Domain. In this section, we provide definitions regarding semantic
domain, conformance, and robust cleanness. We begin with the definition of our
semantic domain, called generalised timed traces [26]. This definition subsumes
both discrete-time state sequences and continuous-time trajectories. A gener-
alised timed trace is a function with a discrete or continuous domain (called
time domain) and a co-domain which is a metric space. Intuitively, a generalized
timed trace maps each element of its time domain to a state. We require that
the set of possible states is a metric space since we study conformance notions
that compare traces based on the distance between the states of the traces.
Definition 1. Let (Y, dY) be a metric space. A Y-valued generalised timed trace
(GTT) is a function μ : T → Y such that T ⊆ R≥0. We call T the time domain
of μ, denoted dom(μ). GTT (Y) is the set of all Y-valued generalised timed traces.
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For a GTT μ : T → Y and time t0 ∈ T , by μ[. . . t0] we denote the prefix of
μ up to t0, i.e., the restriction μ|t∈T :t≤t0 ; likewise, by μ[ts . . . te], we shall denote
the restriction μ|t∈T :ts≤t≤te
A hybrid system is a mapping from generalised (input) traces to sets of
generalised (output) timed traces.
Definition 2. A Y-valued hybrid system is a function H : GTT (Y) →
P(GTT (Y)) such that for all μ ∈ GTT (Y) and all μ′ ∈ H (μ) it holds that
dom(μ′) = dom(μ). We define H(Y) to be the set of all Y-valued hybrid systems.
In addition, we distinguish deterministic hybrid systems whose output values
range over singleton sets only. In what follows, we identify deterministic hybrid
systems with functions of the type GTT (Y)→ GTT (Y).
For simplicity, we assume that the input and output domain are defined on
the same metric spaces. The generalisation to different spaces is straightforward.
Conformance Relations. Recently, a number of notions of conformance for cyber-
physical systems have been proposed [3,33]. It turns out that these notions, two
of which are quoted below, can provide a rigorous basis for doping detection.
Note that throughout the paper, the variables τ and ǫ (with possible sub-
scripts) always range over non-negative real numbers.
Definition 3. We say that Y-valued GTTs μ1 : T1 → Y and μ2 : T2 → Y are:
– trace conformant with tolerance threshold for signal value ǫ, notation
TraceConfǫ(μ1, μ2), if T1 = T2 and for all t ∈ T1, dY(μ1(t), μ2(t)) ≤ ǫ
– hybrid conformant with thresholds τ and ǫ, denoted HybridConfτ,ǫ(μ1, μ2), if:
• ∀t1 ∈ T1 ∃t2 ∈ T2 : |t2 − t1| ≤ τ ∧ dY(μ2(t2), μ1(t1)) ≤ ǫ
• ∀t2 ∈ T2 ∃t1 ∈ T1 : |t1 − t2| ≤ τ ∧ dY(μ1(t1), μ2(t2)) ≤ ǫ
– Skorokhod conformant with tolerance thresholds τ and ǫ, notation
SkorConfτ,ǫ(μ1, μ2), if T1 and T2 are intervals and there is a strictly increasing
continuous bijection r : T1 → T2 called retiming, such that:
• for all t ∈ T1, |r(t)− t| ≤ τ , and
• for all t ∈ T1, dY(μ1(t), μ2(r(t))) ≤ ǫ.
We show in the proposition below and also in our generalisation results in
Sect. 4, that these notions are closely related. However, they also have some
fundamental differences, that can be illustrated using the example in Fig. 1.
Example 2. Consider again the example shown in Fig. 1. We can see that in
Fig. 1.(a) ist and idev are trace conformant with value threshold ǫ, as they only
exhibit point-wise deviations by values less than ǫ. In contrast, ist and iddev in
Fig. 1.(b) are not trace conformant, yet they are hybrid conformant with time
and value margins τ and ǫ, respectively. The key difference is that the inputs
depicted in Fig. 1.(b) are very different if compared point-wise, but if one allows
for retiming, they are close enough in value after retiming.
The outputs o′(ist) and o
′(iddev ) in Fig. 1.(d) illustrate the fundamental dif-
ference between hybrid and Skorokhod conformance: although the order of rising
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and falling signals are reversed in the two trajectories, they are still hybrid con-
formant, because hybrid conformance disregards the order. However, Skorokhod
conformance requires an order-preserving retiming, and hence distinguishes these
two trajectories. On the other hand, such retiming exists, e.g., for ist and iddev
in Fig. 1.(b), witnessing their Skorokhod conformance.
We shall use the following notation. We write Conf1 ⊑ Conf2 whenever for
all μ1 : T1 → Y and μ2 : T2 → Y, we have Conf1(μ1, μ2) =⇒ Conf2(μ1, μ2). We
write Conf1 ⊏ Conf2 whenever Conf1 ⊑ Conf2 and ¬Conf2 ⊑ Conf1.
Proposition 1. For any τ, ǫ ∈ R≥0, the following relations hold:
TraceConfǫ ⊏ SkorConfτ,ǫ ⊏ HybridConfτ,ǫ
Robust Cleanness. We shall now state the original definition of robust cleanness
from [15], adapted to our framework of hybrid systems. It is based on Definition
7 and Proposition 19 from [15]; the phrasing below abstracts from the so-called
parameters of interest and standard inputs. Moreover it is cast in the setting
of generalised timed traces rather than discrete-step programs, and stated using
trace conformance with different thresholds for inputs and outputs, κI and κO.
Intuitively, a hybrid system is robustly clean if for every pair of input prefixes
on which no difference in the inputs exceeding κI has occurred so far (i.e., all
sub-prefixes are trace conformant), the corresponding sets of output prefixes are
also conformant with respect to κO. As we consider nondeterministic systems,
Hausdorff distance is used to compare sets of outputs (see [15] for details).
Definition 4. A hybrid system H is robustly clean, denoted RobustClean
(κI , κO), whenever:
∀i1, i2 ∈ GTT (Y) : ∀t ∈ dom(i1) ∪ dom(i2) :(
∀t′ ≤ t : TraceConfκI (i1[. . . t
′], i2[. . . t
′]) =⇒(
(∀o1 ∈ H (i1)∃o2 ∈ H (i2) : TraceConfκO (o1[. . . t], o2[. . . t])) ∧
(∀o2 ∈ H (i2)∃o1 ∈ H (i1) : TraceConfκO (o1[. . . t], o2[. . . t]))
)
Note that in the above definition we do not require that dom(i1) = dom(i2).
In practice, robust cleanness is typically applied to pairs of traces that are both
defined over N. Here, however, for the sake of generality we impose no such
restriction. In particular, when the time domains of two traces are different, for
example disjoint, the predicate RobustClean will trivially evaluate to true.
Example 3. Consider the traces depicted in Fig. 1. The input prefixes ist and
iddev are given in Fig. 1.(b), and the corresponding pair of outputs is shown
in Fig. 1.(c). The trace ist results in output o(ist) and iddev results in o(iddev ).
Suppose that ǫ < |ist(t0) − iddev (t0)| and ǫ < |o(ist)(t1) − o(iddev )(t1)| at some
time t1. Thus, the left-hand side of the implication in the Definition 4 instantiated
with κI = κO = ǫ does not hold for any t
′. Hence, regardless of the outputs, this
pair of inputs satisfies the condition of RobustClean(ǫ, ǫ), and, if these are the only
traces in a hybrid system H then we can conclude that H is RobustClean(ǫ, ǫ).
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4 Conformance-Based Cleanness
We now define a general notion of conformance-based cleanness and provide two
instantiations based on the conformance notions defined in the previous section.
The need for considering disturbance in time as well as in value is motivated
by our running example from Fig. 1. One of the challenges in performing doping
tests for cyber-physical systems is that in such systems timing is rarely perfectly
precise, due to imprecision in measurements, or caused by the interaction with
the physical world. As illustrated in Example 1, for instance, when checking for
software doping in a car [10], the input to the system is the value of the car’s
speed over time, which is under the control of a driver, and can thus vary from
one execution to the other, even if the driver is trying to execute the same input
sequence. Clearly, those variations can be in value, as well as in time.
Example 4. Consider the test setup sketched in Fig. 1. There, ist and iddev ,
depicted in Fig. 1.(b) define speed of a car as a function of time. These two input
sequences follow a trajectory of values differing by a small margin ǫ (the differ-
ence in value allowed by the standard defining the doping tests), but also shifted
by a small unit of time τ . Observe further that |ist(t0) − iddev (t0)| ≫ ǫ. Thus,
without allowing for deviations in time when comparing these input sequences,
they will be considered sufficiently different, and as a result their respective
exhaust emission outputs will fall out of the comparison when checking for doping
according to Definition 4, even if the NOx emission values in the corresponding
outputs H (ist(t)) and H (iddev (t)) are vastly different, as depicted in Fig. 1.(c).
This results in a false negative, i.e., failing to detect a clearly doped system.
In the above example, we demonstrated that not accounting for timing dis-
turbances when relating input trajectories can result in false negatives in doping
detection. Dually, using the traditional comparison for output traces can result
in false positives by requiring overly strict matching of outputs.
The above example motivates the need to account for timing deviations in tra-
jectories. Intuitively, for input trajectories this relaxation results in considering
more traces as conforming, and thus enforcing more comparisons when checking
if a system is clean. For output trajectories this means relaxing the conformance
requirement by considering two output sequences as conforming even if their
values are not perfectly aligned in time. Furthermore, different types of timing
deviations need to be considered in different scenarios, for example, depending
on whether the order in which values occur is important or not.
Example 5. Consider the testing workflow from Example 1 and Fig. 1, where
inputs ist and iddev are passed to a car. In the second experiment, depicted in
Fig. 1.(d), the car outputs o′(ist) and o
′(iddev ), which are hybrid conformant
for ǫ and τ . Hence this observation of the system is classified as clean under
hybrid output conformance. However, the output o′(iddev ) is clearly suspicious,
as the values in o′(iddev ) and o
′(ist) are reversed. This motivates considering
conformance notions that require retimings to be order-preserving. Indeed, using
Skorokhod conformance we can detect that the system is doped.
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The above examples show that in order to be useful in a diverse set of applica-
tions, a software cleanness theory should allow for using a variety of conformance
notions. To this end, we next take a more general view on conformance notions,
in order to be able to develop a generic conformance-based cleanness framework.
So far, we have defined three specific notions of conformance which either
coincide, or are closely inspired by ones that have appeared in the literature. In
order to define a general framework for cleanness, we also wish to treat notions
of conformance in a more generic manner. To this end, we propose an abstract
definition of conformance predicates. As conformance predicates admit variations
in time, as well as in value, our definition is based on retimings, a device that
will play a key role in the context of this work. In its general form a retiming
is a pair of functions between two time domains. Intuitively, given two GTTs, a
retiming will define a mapping from points in each of the traces to points in the
other trace. Note that in general the mappings are not required to be injective;
this way we can cater for notions of conformance allowing for the so-called local
disorder phenomenon (in particular hybrid conformance – see Proposition 2).
Definition 5. A retiming is a pair of functions between two time domains, i.e.,
a pair of the form (r1, r2), where r1 : T1 → T2 and r2 : T2 → T1, with time
domains T1, T2 ⊆ R≥0. Given two time domains T1 and T2, we denote the set of
all retimings between T1 and T2 with RET (T1, T2).
Retiming is explicitly present in the definition of Skorokhod conformance;
there, each Skorokhod retiming is required to be a strictly increasing continuous
bijection. We can express a Skorokhod retiming r as an instance of our definition
as the pair (r, r−1). In fact, one can also define hybrid conformance, as well as a
whole class of conformance notions, using a suitable family of retimings.
A family of retimings Ret can be further constrained by τ to a subset Retτ of
Ret containing only functions that shift time by at most τ time units. In order
to use a family of retimings for concrete sequences μ1 and μ2, it is necessary to
consider only functions that match the domains of the sequences. This leads to
a generic notion of conformance associated with a given family of retimings Ret,
a given time threshold τ and a given value threshold ǫ.
Definition 6. Let Ret be a family of retimings, and let
Retτ
△
= {(r1, r2) ∈ Ret | ∀t ∈ dom(ri) : |ri(t)− t| ≤ τ (i = 1, 2)},
Retτ (T1, T2)
△
= Retτ ∩RET (T1, T2).
A conformance notion with time threshold τ and value threshold ǫ induced by Ret
is a predicate Conf Retτ,ǫ on pairs of GTTs such that, for μ1 : T1 → Y, μ2 : T2 → Y:
Conf
Ret
τ,ǫ (μ1, μ2) ⇐⇒ ∃(r1, r2) ∈ Retτ (T1, T2) : ∀t ∈ T1 : dY(μ1(t), μ2 ◦ r1(t)) ≤ ǫ
∧ ∀t ∈ T2 : dY(μ2(t), μ1 ◦ r2(t)) ≤ ǫ.
Using the above definition, we can easily express the specific notions of confor-
mance defined in the previous section by selecting a suitable family of retimings.
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Proposition 2. The conformance predicates below coincide with the notions of
conformance induced by the corresponding families of retimings:
– TraceConfǫ is induced by the family of retimings containing only identity func-
tions: Retid = {(id, id) | id : T → T is the identity on some T ⊆ R≥0}.
– SkorConfτ,ǫ is induced by the family of retimings
Ret = {(r, r−1) | r is a strictly increasing continuous bijection}.
– HybridConfτ,ǫ is induced by pairs of arbitrary functions.
Definition 6 also enables us to define other notions of conformance, such as,
for instance a “shift conformance”, which, intuitively, shifts all time points by a
given constant c ∈ R, i.e., Retc = {(r, r
−1) | r(t) = t+ c}.
Next, we define a generic notion of cleanness, parametrised by conformance
predicates for the input and for the output traces. Instantiating these predicates
with existing or new conformance notions, yields different conformance-based
notions of cleanness that can capture a variety of cleanness specifications.
We now extend the notion of robust cleanness [15] to allow for “small” varia-
tions in time, in addition to the variations in value. To this end, the new notion
makes use of two conformance predicates, one that postulates when two input
traces should be considered close enough, and another one that specifies when
two output traces are close enough.
Our starting point, the notion of robust cleanness in Definition 4, is based on
comparison of matching prefixes of a pair of input traces and the corresponding
prefixes of the associated output traces. As we now want to accommodate for
distance in time, we (1) compare prefixes using a conformance relation, and
(2) allow for variation in the length of the compared prefixes that is within
the corresponding time-distance threshold. More precisely, when comparing two
prefixes, we allow for discarding start and end segments of length at most τ .
This intuition is formalized by the predicate PrefConf for relaxed compari-
son of GTT prefixes using a notion of conformance Conf with tolerance thresh-
old τ for time disturbance. We use cascaded notation to define PrefConf as a
higher-order function taking Conf as its first argument. The predicate PrefConf
compares two prefixes μ1 and μ2 by requiring that there exist traces μ1[t
s
1 . . . t
e
1]
and μ2[t
s
2 . . . t
e
2] obtained from them, that are conformant with respect to Conf.
These traces are obtained by possibly removing a sub-prefix of length at most
τ , and/or removing extending with a suffix of length at most τ .
Definition 7. Let Conf be a notion of conformance on GTTs with tolerance
threshold τ for time disturbance. For any pair of GTTs μ1 : T1 → Y, μ2 : T2 →
Y, and t ∈ T = T1 ∪ T2, the predicate PrefConf is defined as:
PrefConf(μ1, μ2, t)⇐⇒∃t
s
1 ∈ [0, τ ] ∩ T1,∃t
e
1 ∈ [t− τ, t+ τ ] ∩ T1,
∃ts2 ∈ [0, τ ] ∩ T2,∃t
e
2 ∈ [t− τ, t+ τ ] ∩ T2:
Conf(μ1[t
s
1 . . . t
e
1], μ2[t
s
2 . . . t
e
2]).
The predicate PrefConf provides a generic notion of prefix-conformance. By
instantiating it with conformance relations ConfI and ConfO for input and out-
put traces respectively, we define the notion of (ConfI ,ConfO)-cleanness.
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For deterministic systems (ConfI ,ConfO)-cleanness requires that for all pairs
of input prefixes for which all sub-prefixes are prefix-conformant w.r.t. ConfI ,
the corresponding pair of output prefixes are prefix-conformant w.r.t. ConfO .
Definition 8. A deterministic system H is (ConfI ,ConfO)-clean if
∀i1, i2 ∈ GTT (Y) : ∀t ∈ dom(i1) ∪ dom(i2) :
(∀t′ ≤ t : PrefConfI (i1, i2, t
′)
)
=⇒ PrefConfO(H (i1),H (i2), t).
The above definition naturally generalises to nondeterministic hybrid systems,
by comparing sets of possible output prefixes using Hausdorff distance as in [15].
Definition 9. A system H is (ConfI ,ConfO)-clean if
∀i1, i2 ∈ GTT (Y) : ∀t ∈ dom(i1) ∪ dom(i2) :(
∀t′ ≤ t : PrefConfI (i1, i2, t
′)
)
=⇒(
(∀o1 ∈ H (i1)∃o2 ∈ H (i2) : PrefConfO(o1, o2, t)) ∧
(∀o2 ∈ H (i2)∃o1 ∈ H (i1) : PrefConfO(o1, o2, t))
)
.
Robust cleanness [15] can be now formulated as conformance-based cleanness,
which establishes that (ConfI ,ConfO)-cleanness is a generalisation. Using hybrid
conformance, we define hybrid-conformance cleanness, and similarly, plugging in
Skorokhod conformance, we define Skorokhod-conformance cleanness. Formally:
– A hybrid system H is robustly clean, denoted RobustClean(κI , κO), if and
only if H is (TraceConfκI ,TraceConfκO )-clean.
– A hybrid system H is hybrid-conformance clean with conformance thresholds
(τI , ǫI , τO, ǫO), which we denote by HybridClean(τI , ǫI , τO, ǫO), if and only if
H is (HybridConfτI ,ǫI , HybridConfτO,ǫO)-clean.
– A hybrid system H is Skorokhod-conformance clean with conformance thresh-
olds (τI , ǫI , τO, ǫO), denoted SkorClean(τI , ǫI , τO, ǫO), if and only if H is
(SkorConfτI ,ǫI , SkorConfτO,ǫO)-clean.
We will now establish some key relations between the cleanness notions
defined previously. We begin by lifting the implication between conformance
relations to implication between cleanness notions defined using those relations.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Conf 1I ⊒ Conf
2
I and Conf
1
O ⊑ Conf
2
O. Then for
any system H: H is (Conf 1I ,Conf
1
O)-clean =⇒ H is (Conf
2
I ,Conf
2
O)-clean.
The proposition above has two important corollaries. The first one explains
the relationships between the original robust cleanness, and notions of cleanness
based on Skorokhod conformance and hybrid conformance, in particular stat-
ing the conservative generalisation property for the latter notions. The second
corollary compares cleanness notions with different conformance thresholds.
Corollary 1. For all τI , τO, ǫI , ǫO ∈ R≥0, the following implications hold:
1. RobustClean(ǫI , ǫO) =⇒ SkorClean(0, ǫI , τO, ǫO) =⇒ HybridClean(0, ǫI ,
τO, ǫO),
Conformance-Based Doping Detection for Cyber-Physical Systems 69
2. HybridClean(τI , ǫI , 0, ǫO) =⇒ SkorClean(τI , ǫI , 0, ǫO) =⇒ RobustClean
(ǫI , ǫO).
Also, RobustClean(ǫI , ǫO) = SkorClean(0, ǫI , 0, ǫO) = HybridClean(0, ǫI , 0, ǫO)
and hence SkorClean and HybridClean are conservative extensions of robust clean-
ness.
Corollary 2. For all ǫI , ǫ
′
I
, ǫO , ǫ
′
O
, τI , τ
′
I
, τO , τ
′
O
that satisfy the inequalities
ǫ′
I
≤ ǫI , τ
′
I
≤ τI , ǫ
′
O
≥ ǫO , τ
′
O
≥ τO the following implications hold:
1. RobustClean(ǫI , ǫO) =⇒ RobustClean(ǫ
′
I
, ǫ′
O
);
2. HybridClean(ǫI , τI , ǫO , τO) =⇒ HybridClean(ǫ
′
I
, τ ′
I
, ǫ′
O
, τ ′
O
);
3. SkorClean(ǫI , τI , ǫO , τO) =⇒ SkorClean(ǫ
′
I
, τ ′
I
, ǫ′
O
, τ ′
O
).
Example 6. Consider the testing workflow in Fig. 1. The inputs passed to a car
are ist and iddev , depicted in Fig. 1.(b). One of the test results is presented in
Fig. 1.(c), where ist reveals output o(ist) and iddev reveals o(iddev ). We assume
that ǫ < |ist(t0)− iddev (t0)| and ǫ < |o(ist)(t1)− o(iddev )(t1)| at some time t1.
– For inputs ist and iddev , any output is immediately deemed RobustClean(ǫ, ǫ),
as the left-hand side of the implication in Definition 8 does not hold for
any t′. Note, that for other inputs the car used for testing might not be
RobustClean(ǫ, ǫ).
– As explained in Example 2, ist and iddev are hybrid conformant for ǫ and
τ , i.e., the predicate PrefConfI on the left-hand side of the implication in
Definition 8 holds. PrefConfO, however, fails at time t1 for signals o(ist) and
o(iddev ). Hence, the system tested in Fig. 1.(c) is not HybridClean(ǫ, τ, ǫ, τ).
We now discuss testing and falsification of conformance-based cleanness.
For systems with discrete time domains the existing methods for verifying [15]
or testing [10] robust cleanness can be readily applied.
In the case of hybrid cleanness, existing methods for testing hybrid confor-
mance, such as [2] and [4] can be extended to testing and falsification of hybrid
cleanness of hybrid systems consisting of traces with finite time domains. Meth-
ods for checking Skorokhod conformance were presented in [17]. Due to the
quantification over all time-points t′ in our Definition 8 and Definition 9, it is not
clear how to directly extend them to testing Skorokhod cleanness.
5 Case Study
In this section we evaluate the proposed notion of hybrid cleanness in the context
of doping detection in relation to the recent Diesel Emissions Scandal.
Conducting software doping tests for cyber-physical systems has a range of
applications. A prominent example is the body of recent work [8–10,14,15,32,34]
that gives insights into the Diesel Emissions Scandal. This is a world-wide scandal
where millions of diesel cars have been equipped with defeat devices reducing the
effectiveness of emission cleaning systems during real-world usage – in contrast
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Fig. 2. Left: New European Driving Cycle (NEDC); Right: test setup with Nissan
NV200 Evalia on a chassis dynamometer attached to a PEMS.
to the regulator-defined driving scenarios on a chassis dynamometer, where the
amount of emitted pollutants are well below the applicable limits.
Assuming the existence of a contract that formalizes when software is consid-
ered to be doped, recent work demonstrates how doping tests can be generated
automatically and how the characteristic challenges arising with these kinds of
tests can be tackled [10]. A major challenge is the distortion of inputs that can
occur during test execution. As doping tests have to be conducted on the final
product, i.e., a vehicle such as a passenger car, a human driver has to provide the
inputs to the car by driving it. It is far from trivial to provide the inputs exactly
as defined by the test case. Official regulations, that define the approval process
for new car models, precisely specify test cycles for which they allow tolerances
in the input of up to 2 km/h (in car speed). But even driving a car within this
tolerance requires a very experienced driver. To strengthen the position of con-
sumers against manufacturers, it is necessary to allow manufacturer-independent
methods to check the compliance of a car model with the applicable regulations,
i.e., the absence of defeat devices. These methods are supposed to require a
reasonable amount of effort, and training a driver over months so that she has
enough experience to stay within the tolerance of 2 km/h is way beyond rea-
sonable effort. This means that the responsibility for accounting for the driver’s
imprecision must be shifted to the techniques for checking for software doping.
In this section we give a short summary of recent doping tests with a diesel
car and demonstrate how the theory developed in this paper addresses the above
challenge. More precisely, it allows us to overcome the imprecise timing leading
to minor input distortions, by appropriately accounting for the effect of retiming
on the input value error. We further show how using our theory one of the tests
reveals strong indications for a defeat device in the car under test – despite a
very inexperienced driver conducting the test. This doping detection would not
have been possible using the cleanness notions existing prior to this work.
Physical Set-Up of the Experiment. Before a car model can be sold, it must meet
the requirements defined in the official regulations. The type approval procedure
requires the car to be placed on a chassis dynamometer. Cars have to follow
certain standardized test cycles, each defined as a function from time to speed.
One of the test cycles, involved in the diesel scandal, was the New European
Driving Cycle (NEDC) [42] shown in Fig. 2. For the tests here, we consider the
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Fig. 3. Initial 200s of PowerNEDC (left) and SineNEDC (right) planned test cycles
(red, dotted) and actually driven (black). (Color figure online)
speed of the car as input, since this is the parameter defining a test cycle. The
total amount of NO and NO2 (abbreviated as NOx) is the only output of interest.
The car under test is a Nissan NV200 Evalia, with Renault 1.5 dci (110hp)
diesel engine and approved w.r.t. regulation Euro 6b. The test set-up is shown
in Fig. 2.
In order to perform a check for defeat devices using a cleanness test, we con-
sider, in addition to the original NEDC, two manually synthesized tests. These
test cycles, denoted PowerNEDC and SineNEDC were proposed in previous
work [10] and are defined as follows. PowerNEDC is based on the NEDC
but slightly deviates from it by enforcing higher accelerations (1.5ms2 instead of
0.94ms2 ) after 56 s, 251 s, 446 s and 641 s. The maximum input deviation from
NEDC is κI =10 km/h. SineNEDC is defined as the NEDC superimposed by
a sine curve, formally SineNEDC(t) = max{0, NEDC(t) + 5 sin(0.5t)}, with a
maximum input deviation from NEDC of κI =5km/h.
These test cycles are defined by specifying the input value (the car’s speed)
in each second. Both test cases are shown by the red dotted lines in Fig. 3.
Conformance-Based Cleanness Tests for NEDC. We have applied our theory of
conformance-based cleanness to check for doping, i.e., the presence of a defeat
device, in the car under test. For this, we have at our disposal the raw data
obtained from three test drives: (1) Test drive dNEDC is the result of NEDC
cycle driven by a human driver. It serves as the reference behaviour of the car,
to which we will compare the executions of the other two test cycles. (2) Test
drive dPowerNEDC is the trajectory that is produced as the result of a human
driver driving PowerNEDC. (3) Test drive dSineNEDC is the trajectory that
is produced as the result of a human driver driving SineNEDC.
The values of the actual sequences of inputs executed by driving the car
are sampled in steps of 0.05 s. As mentioned earlier, the human in the loop
makes testing considerably more challenging. The maximum deviation of inputs
compared to the test specification for NEDC is just below 10 km/h, for Pow-
erNEDC is almost 12 km/h, and for SineNEDC it approaches 16 km/h.
This shows that the perturbation introduced by the human driver is clearly
noticeable. The amount of NOx measured for dNEDC is 180mg/km, for
dPowerNEDC and dSineNEDC the measurements revealed 204mg/km and
584mg/km, respectively.
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In order to detect doping (by falsifying cleanness), the input sequences of
dPowerNEDC and dSineNEDC have to be each compared to dNEDC, and if
the input sequences in the corresponding pair are conforming, then the respective
outputs (the total NOx emission values) have to be checked for conformance.
As we desire for our doping tests to be as strict as possible, we identify hybrid
conformance HybridConfτI ,ǫI , i.e., the weakest of the conformance relations dis-
cussed in Sect. 3, as the most suitable conformance relation for the comparison
of input traces. As the outputs are just single values, the choice of output con-
formance relation is immaterial in this case, so we take HybridConf0,ǫO .
Formally, we consider the deterministic hybrid system H defined by the input
GTTs dNEDC, dPowerNEDC, and dSineNEDC, and check whether H is
HybridClean(τI , ǫI , 0, ǫO)-clean for given values of τI , ǫI and ǫO.
The driver’s imprecision has a significant effect on the values in the input
sequences and their timing. This can lead to dismissing pairs of sequences if
they are incorrectly deemed too far apart, and thus missing some indications of
doping. For instance, a too strict comparison of dSineNEDC to dNEDC will
dismiss this pair of executions; however, the measured NOx emission during the
dSineNEDC drive is three times more than the one measured during dNEDC.
Testing HybridClean(τI , ǫI , 0, ǫO) allows us to perform a realistic comparison
by taking into account the two possible sources of driving errors: the over- or
undershooting of the speed, and the timing offsets, where the driver accelerates
or decelerates too fast or too slowly. In comparison, prior doping tests based
on Robust Cleanness, considered only the former, i.e., the point-wise offset in
speed. As we demonstrate, depending on the specified value threshold, there
are cases when this is insufficient to identify doping. Indeed, looking into the
official regulations, we can see that they allow for a timing variation of one
second [19,42]. Thus, essentially, the regulations allow for hybrid conformance
with τI = 1 s.
Hybrid Cleanness Testing. In order to test HybridClean(τI , ǫI , 0, ǫO) we have
to examine the conformance relations HybridConfτI ,ǫI (dNEDC,dPowerNEDC)
and HybridConfτI ,ǫI (dNEDC,dSineNEDC) between the corresponding input
sequences. Recall that since the output of the system measured in each test
is the total amount of NOx emitted during the test, i.e., a single value for the
whole execution, timing plays no role when quantifying the value error for the
output.
In order to evaluate the power of using hybrid cleanness for detecting doping,
we consider different values for ǫI and τI , and perform two types of analysis of
the results of testing HybridClean(τI , ǫI , 0, ǫO), which we describe below.
Effect of τI on the Minimal ǫI for Which Inputs are Conforming. First,
we fix a maximum value that we allow for the time offset τI . For this τI we
analyse our dataset to find the minimal ǫI such that for the combination τI and
ǫI the input traces under consideration satisfy hybrid conformance. For τI = 0
we get exactly the ǫI for which the two traces are trace conformant. Table 1 (left
side) shows the computed ǫI values for τI = 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10.
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As expected, when we increase τI , the minimal ǫI decreases. At some point
(at τI = 2 for PowerNEDC and τI = 5 for SineNEDC) the decrease in the
value error reduces notably. This happens because the error is only partially
caused by the incorrect timing of the driver.
From the values reported in Table 1 (left) we see that if, for example, we
allow deviation for the input τI = 1, as per the official regulation, and set
ǫI = 15, then we have that both HybridConfτI ,ǫI (dNEDC,dPowerNEDC) and
HybridConfτI ,ǫI (dNEDC,dSineNEDC) are true, while, for τI = 0 both are false.
Thus, under hybrid conformance these pairs of traces will be considered in the
cleanness test, while under trace conformance they will be dismissed.
Table 1. Value thresholds for fixed τI (left) and time thresholds for fixed ǫI (right).
Values are given as mg/km and time in seconds.
τI = 0 τI = 0.5 τI = 1 τI = 2 τI = 5 τI = 10 ǫI = κI ǫI = κI +2
Power ǫI = 15.88 ǫI = 15.03 ǫI = 12.41 ǫI = 10.10 ǫI = 10.07 ǫI = 10.07 τI = 67.35 τI = 10.8
Sine ǫI = 16.17 ǫI = 15.46 ǫI = 14.24 ǫI = 12.91 ǫI = 11.67 ǫI = 11.37 τI = 72.4 τI = 4.05
Since the difference between the outputs measured during dSineNEDC and
during dNEDC is vast, we establish that HybridClean(1, 15, 0, 180) does not hold.
Effect of ǫI on the Minimal τI for Which Inputs are Conforming. Sec-
ond, we fix the maximum value error ǫI and examine what minimal τI results
in a combination τI and ǫI for which the analysed data is hybrid conformant.
For the synthesized test cases we study the error tolerance ǫI set to the respec-
tive input thresholds κI . As discussed above, this is 10 km/h for PowerNEDC
and 5 km/h for SineNEDC. We also consider the scenario where the error tol-
erance allowed by the official regulation for the test cycle is added, that is, we
also consider ǫI = κI +2km/h. The two rightmost columns of Table 1 show the
necessary time shifts to achieve these value errors. As apparent, they reduce by
approximately 84% and 94% when adding the error tolerance of 2 km/h.
These values for τI give us the minimal tolerance threshold for time, for
which HybridClean(τI , ǫI , 0, 180) is violated in H for the given ǫI ; the value of ǫO
is fixed at 180mg/km according to the standard [10].
Evaluation and Discussion. The analysis of the data shows that it is indeed
necessary to not only consider a deviation of value, but to also allow for timing
deviations, especially when the quality of the studied driving tests suffers from
the human-caused input distortions. In terms of the theory established in this
paper, this means that in scenarios like this one, employing HybridClean is more
adequate than using prior notions such as RobustClean, and without this, the
cases of doping we have detected would go unnoticed. Allowing a retiming of
up to 10.8 s (for PowerNEDC) and of 4.05 s (for SineNEDC) makes both
inputs conformant to the NEDC input, so we are able to detect the violation
of SineNEDC for the hybrid cleanness for the specified desired value error
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tolerance. While these time deviations appear large given the test cycle timeline,
they are acceptable when we recall that the tests are executed by human drivers.
If, on the other hand, we want to restrict the tolerance in time to one sec-
ond, we are able to consider both tests for the hybrid cleanness for value error
tolerance of 12.41 km/h for PowerNEDC and 14.24 km/h for SineNEDC.
This demonstrates how conformance-based cleanness notions like HybridClean
allow us to some extent to account for human-caused errors related to timing.
Finally, while hybrid cleanness is arguably the appropriate notion for the case
study considered here, our generic theory of conformance-based cleanness allows
for using other conformance notions as appropriate for the CPS under test.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a theory of doping detection and cleanness based on
the notions of conformance for cyber-physical systems. Our new notion accounts
for possible “deviations” of the system output, upon “perturbing” its inputs,
both in time and in values. Both notions of “deviation” and “perturbation”
turn out to be expressible using a generic notion of retiming. We instantiate
our definition with specific notions of retiming from the conformance testing
literature. We apply our notions to a case study from the automotive domain and
demonstrate how our generalised notions are useful in using actual driving cycles
for doping detection according to the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) [42].
We intend to turn our theory into an automatic tool for doping detection,
using hybrid systems models. We intend to use the HyConf tool [4] as the start-
ing point and use our search-based testing implementation in HyConf [5] to
automate the process of test-case generation and test-case selection. Once this
process is automated, one can generate test-cases that can go beyond a specific
standard and detect intelligent defeat devices that cheat the standards and the
tests prescribed by them.
We also intend to organise widespread experiments regarding emission detec-
tion to put our theory into practice. Our experimental set-up involves instru-
menting a large number of cars using low-cost equipments, constructing models
of emission behaviour, and generating realistic driving scenarios that are more
likely to detect doping.
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